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### **Abstract**

*Artikel ini menggambarkan HizbututTahrir sebagai sebuah gerakan sosial di era pasca-Soeharto dan pandangannya tentang pembentukan kembali kekhalifahan Islam. Dari perspektif gerakan sosial dapat dikatakan munculnya Hizbuu Tahrir Indonesia jelas-jelas merupakan respon terhadap berbagai mengalami kerusakan yang terjadi di Indonesia mulai dari kemiskinan, ketidakadilan, korupsi, dan demoralisasi. Bencana-bencana sosial yang disebabkan oleh implementasi pemerintah Indonesia sekuler atau kafir (orang kafir) sistem terpancar dari nilai-nilai Barat. Untuk melarikan diri dari masalah tersebut, HizbutTahrir dan HTI adalah untuk mendorong penerapan Syariah Islam sepenuhnya dari dengan restorasi kekhalifahan Islam di seluruh dunia. HTI menyadari sepenuhnya bahwa untuk mendirikan sebuah kekhalifahan Islam membutuhkan tindakan kolektif dan dukungan banyak orang.*

*This article describes HizbututTahrir as a social movement in post-Suharto era, and his views on the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. In the perspective of the emergence of social movements can be said Hizbuu Tahrir Indonesia is clearly a response to a variety of damage that occurred in Indonesia ranging from poverty, injustice, corruption, and demoralization. Social disasters caused by the implementation of the Indonesian government or secular infidels (unbelievers) system emanating from Western values. To escape from such problems, HizbutTahrir and HTI is to encourage full implementation of Islamic Sharia from the restoration of the Islamic caliphate throughout the world. HTI is fully aware that to establish an Islamic caliphate requires collective action and support of many people.*

**Key words : Hizbut Tahrir, HTI, ideology, social movement.**

## A. Background

After the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998, social-religious life experienced many changes. This marked the rise of social movements that make Islam as their ideology. Scholars identify them as Islamic fundamentalist movement. One of the fundamentalist movements in question is *Hizbut-Tahrîr*. This movement is an Islamic party that is transnational and when entering Indonesia, it was known as *Hizbut-Tahrîr* Indonesia abbreviated HTI.

The rapid increase of HTI coincided with the rise of public discontent with the post-Suharto or *reformasi* period. There is no doubt that there is a rising assumption in society that political, economic, and law reforms carried by *reformasi*<sup>1</sup> and transnational issues such as democracy and globalization has had significant advantage in improving people's daily lives at many levels. For example, what has been claimed by HTI is that globalization for the third countries over the world pose a new imperialism or a giant machine producing poverty, and other human deteriorations.<sup>2</sup> These unfavourable conditions give HTI justification to claim that Indonesia- nowadays- really needs a radical and comprehensive system, what HTI called as *al-khilâfah al-Islâmiyah* (Islamic caliphate).<sup>3</sup>

This research will examine HTI as a social movement,<sup>4</sup> because of three reasons. The first is that HTI is a collective movement to

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<sup>1</sup>B. Muhtadi, 'The Quest for Hizbut Tahrîr in Indonesia', in *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 2009, p. 623.

<sup>2</sup>[www.jurnal-ekonomi.org](http://www.jurnal-ekonomi.org)

<sup>3</sup> Muhtadi, B., 'The Quest for *HizbutTahrîr* in Indonesia', in *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 2009, p. 623.

<sup>4</sup> Even though in old social movement paradigm religion is not recognised as main factor causing social movement. According this paradigm that becoming main aspect in social movement is class struggle or what was known as *class interpretation*. J.Pakulski, 'Social Movement and class: The Decline of Marxist Paradigm', in L. Maheu (ed), *Social Movement and Social classes: The Future of Collective Action*, Sage Publication Ltd, London, 1995, p 55. Quoted by S. Arifin, 'ideology danPraksisGerakanSosialKaumFundamentalis: Pengalaman *Hizbut tahrîr* Indonesia', (ideology and Praxis of Social Movement of Fundamental Group: The Experience of *Hizbut tahrîr* Indonesia), (Malang: UNM Press, 2005), p.64. However, Sanderson argues that religion played it significant role in creating social movement such as revitalization and millenarian movement. These social-religious movements according Sanderson, often appear if tension and extreme social crisis occur in social life. S.K. Sanderson, *Sosiologi Makro: Sebuah Pendekatan terhadap Realitas Sosial*, (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1991), p. 531-532. Quoted by S. Arifin, p. 66.

which lots of people get involved in. As pointed out in one definition of social movement is that, “*social movement is any collection of people who organize together to achieve or prevent some social or political change.*”<sup>5</sup> Secondly, HTI has ideology. For social movements such HTI the presence of ideology is a very important thing because of keeping its existence. In this context, ideology means a set of ideas by which humans posit, explain, and justify the ends and means of organized social action. The last is because the emergence of the social movement or fundamentalism Islamic movement is triggered by many factors including social, economic, politic, and soon.<sup>6</sup>

The above- mentioned cases invite my sense of curiosity by questioning some aspects of HTI, such as, how does HTI view the current situations dealing with Indonesian society?, What is the ideal society that HTI will establish?, in what way will HTI achieve the ideal society?, and what influence does HTI make on social-religious change?

## **B. History, Ideology of Hizbut tahrîr and HTI**

### **1. Brief History of *Hizbut tahrîr***

To comprehend the history of *Hizbut Tahrîr* clearly, it cannot be separated with the history of its founder, Taqiuddin an-Nabhani (1909-1977). Why it is very important to describe is because he has established the ideology of party which should be hold by all branches of *Hizbut tahrîr* . In other words, one of the prominent features of *Hizbut tahrîr* is the acceptance by all branches of *Hizbut tahrîr* on the central ideology (that *Taqiuddin* has built), of course still keeping the local interest facing each these branches. Therefore, there is substantive similarity in all branches of *Hizbut tahrîr* in the world in terms of ideology construction, objectives, and themes voiced of *Hizbut tahrîr* .<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>B. M. Scott and M. A. Schwartz, *Sociology: Making Sense of the Social World*, (Boston: Ally and Bacon, 2006), p. 76. Quoted by S. Arifin, p. 68.

<sup>6</sup>S. Arifin, *Op.Cit.*, p. 68-70.

<sup>7</sup>G. Fealy, ‘HizbutTahrîr in Indonesia: Seeking A “Total” Islamic identity’, in Akbarzadeh&Mansouri, *Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West*, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), p.158.

*Hizbut tahrîr* was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by *Taqiuddin an-Nabhani*. He was born (1909) in *Ijizm*, a village near Haifa,<sup>8</sup> in the North Palestine. He passed away in 1977 and was buried in *Auza'i*, Beirut.<sup>9</sup> He became a jurist in Amman, Jordan after he studied law at *al-Azhar University* Cairo. During his studies, he has got involved in many activities of the Muslim Brotherhood. He also has consumed various literatures authored by the thinkers and activists of this organisation.<sup>10</sup> Not surprisingly, when he went back to his home, *Haifa*, he acted as a key figure in its branch of the Muslim Brothers until the detachment of Palestine<sup>11</sup>. This contact would in turn affect the way he thought and looked at the social-political problems which he dealt with.

After finishing his study in *al-Azhar University*, *al-Nabhani* went back to Palestine to work in the Palestinian education ministry as a teacher in junior high school in *Kaifa*. Beside this he was also acting as teacher in an Islamic school in the same place. However, in 1938, he applied for work at the *Sharia* court because as a judge he could demolish Western influence in education even more in the field of Islamic law. Furthermore, by engaging in the *Sharia* court, he could keep a distance from the education sphere in the ministry, having a great opportunity to implement his knowledge of *Shariah* law. Apparently, he is really concerned with the implementation of *Shariah* law that has not been totally in daily life. According to him, though the family law (*ahwal al-shakhsyah*) and some of its derivations have been applied, there is still other law which he accessed from secular value or from *kâfir* (out of Islam).<sup>12</sup>

*Nabhani's* anxiety, criticism of the conditions experienced by Muslim, and offered solutions have been continuing to be propagated, not only when he became a teacher and judge, but also taking advantage of the pulpit by giving sermons at the mosque *al-Aqsa* and *al-Ibrahim al-Khali*.<sup>13</sup> In his contention, the main problem faced by

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<sup>8</sup>D. Commins, 'Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and The Islamic Liberation Party', in *The Muslim World Journal*, vol. LXXXI, No. 3-4, 1991, p. 194.

<sup>9</sup>S. Arifin, *Op.Cit.*, p. 89.

<sup>10</sup>G. Fealy, *Op.Cit.*, p. 153.

<sup>11</sup>D. Commins, *Op.Cit.*, p. 194.

<sup>12</sup>S. Arifin, *Op.Cit.*, p. 91-92.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 93-94.

Muslim is about politics, so that is why to overcome it by building political institution is the best solution. As a result, in 1953 the Islamic Liberation Party (*Hizbut tahrîr*) was established with the prominent aims to revitalize the Muslim Word from its current adversity, to liberate Muslim from the secular thoughts, system, and laws, and also to restore the Islamic caliphate.<sup>14</sup>

## 2. Ideology

One of the important elements that should be reckoned in the study of social movement is the existence of an ideology. In this field, ideology means the set of values, ideas, beliefs, purposes and rational justifications to individual and collective action in a social movement.<sup>15</sup> As a social movement, *Hizbut tahrîr* acknowledges Islam as their ideology of struggle.

Like Muslim Brothers, *Hizbut tahrîr* declares that Islamic values cover all aspects of daily life without exception.<sup>16</sup> In other words, Islam is a religion including spiritual and social field simultaneously. Therefore, in the viewpoint of *Hizbut tahrîr* Islam poses a religion and an ideology as well. One of Indonesian *hizbiyyin*<sup>17</sup> (Hafidz Abdurrahman) argued that Islam like other religions in the world has the set of rule in the ritual activities, but only Islam, from these religions, sets up the secular aspects in everyday life such as about economy, social, education, court, and other areas. Because of the breadth of Islamic thoughts, Abdurrahman does not justify a person who combines Islam with other secular ideology such as capitalism or socialism.<sup>18</sup> Among these ideologies (capitalism and

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<sup>14</sup>M. N. M. Osman, Reviving the caliphate in the Nusantara: *Hizbut Tahrîr Indonesia's Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia*, *Working Paper*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 2009, p. 1-2. Available at: [se2.isn.ch/-serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/96400/.../en/WP171.pdf](http://se2.isn.ch/-serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/96400/.../en/WP171.pdf). Accessed on 24 May 2011.

<sup>15</sup>D. A. Snow and S. C. Byrd, *Ideology, framing Processes, and Islamic terrorist Movement*, a paper presented at a New York University Conference, 2000, p. 120. Available at: <https://webfiles.uci.edu/sbyrd-/home/terroristmovements.snow.byrd.2007.pdf>. Accessed on 20 May 2011.

<sup>16</sup>G. Fealy, *Op.Cit.*, p. 153.

<sup>17</sup>*Hizbiyyin* is a name of the followers of *Hizbut Tahrîr*

<sup>18</sup>S. Arifin, *Op.Cit.*, p. 104.

socialism) Islam is the comprehensive ideology whilst both capitalism and socialism contain very real weaknesses.<sup>19</sup>

### **3. *Hizbut tahrîr Indonesia***

HTI is a branch of *HizbutUtTahrîr*. HTI was brought from Australia in the early 1980s. In Australia,<sup>20</sup> Abdullah bin Nuh, Islamic teacher and preacher who has *al-Qazahali-pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Bogor, West Java, became acquainted with *hizbiyyin* in Sydney, one of them is Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, Palestinian activist of *Hizbut tahrîr* who emigrated to Australia in the 1960s. *Bin Nuh* invited *al-Baghdadi* to disseminate the teachings of *Hizbut tahrîr*.<sup>21</sup>

When al-Baghdadi arrived in Indonesia in 1982, he utilized Bin Nuh's *pesantren* as headquarter to disseminate *Hizbut tahrîr*'s teachings. From the headquarter, the teachings of *Hizbut tahrîr* and the recruitment was expanded outside the *pesantren*. *Halaqah* (study circles) and *daurah* (training programmes) were introduced as intensive method of recruitment.<sup>22</sup> Both *al-Baghdadi* and *Bin Nuh* tried to attract recruits on several university campuses, in particular the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB), the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), and the University of Indonesia, as well as at Mosques across java.<sup>23</sup> Under Seoharto's regime, HTI was a clandestine organization trying to avoid Seoharto's intimidation. HTI never use *Hizbut tahrîr* terminology in their documents and waited until Seoharto's fall.<sup>24</sup> In 1998 the downfall of Seoharto's regime took place. This situation encouraged HTI to bring it into public view. Therefore, in early 2000, for the first time the organization held an international conference hosted in Jakarta and aimed to introduce the

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<sup>19</sup>D. Commins, p. 197-198. For example, capitalism separates religion role from daily life and guarantees the absolute freedom of religion, property, person and opinion. While communism declares religion is opium in society in which religion prevents a person to take action creatively and innovatively.

<sup>20</sup>Abdullah came to Sydney, Australia, where his son was being educated.

<sup>21</sup>A. Horstmann, 'Transnational ideologies and Actors at the level of Society in South and Southeast Asia', in *NBR Project report*, 2009, p. 47.

<sup>22</sup>B. Muhtadi, 'Op.Cit.', p. 626.

<sup>23</sup>G. Fealy, 'Op.Cit.', p. 155.

<sup>24</sup>K. Ward, 'Non-Violent Extremists? HizbutTahrîr Indonesia', in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 63:2, 2009, p. 150-151.

goal of a caliphate. In 2001, HTI added “Indonesia” to their party’s name.<sup>25</sup> In August 2007 HTI organized again the caliphate conference at Bung Karno stadium in Jakarta and attracted approximately 50.000 people. HTI has sharply build branches mainly in urban areas entirely in Indonesia.<sup>26</sup>

### **C.Indonesia’s Problems**

Sanderson has explained that social movements including religious movements very often appear if tension and extreme social crisis occur in social life. Based on this argument, it can be argued the emergence of *Hizbut tahrîr* in Indonesia is certainly a response to various deteriorations that occurred in Indonesia. In general, the multi-dimension crisis faced by Indonesia such as poverty, ignorance, injustice, corruption, demoralization, and so on was caused by the Indonesian government’s implementation of secular or *kâfîr* (unbeliever) system<sup>27</sup> emanated from Western values. This is because the secular system put Islamic values into private sector whilst in social sphere Islam has been left. As a result, social disorder takes place for example capitalistic economy, opportunistic political behaviour, hedonistic culture, selfish and individualistic social life, and materialistic education.<sup>28</sup>

Following scheme will describe this cause:

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
<sup>25</sup>K. Ward, *Op.Cit.*, p. 151

<sup>26</sup>A. Horstmann, *Op.Cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>27</sup>The secular system includes democracy, liberalism, secularism, capitalism, nation-state project, and globalization. However, according to spokesperson of HTI (IslamilYusanto) that in *Hizbut Tahrîr* known two concepts, they are *khadarah* and *madaniyah*. *Khadarah* means a set of Muslim’s worldview or belief does not allow Muslim to adhere the worldview or ideology which is from outside Islam. That is way, these secular or Western ideologies are prohibited to be consumed by Muslim. The second one refers to the results of science and technology in the form of physical objects used everyday life such as transport, communication tools, and so forth. During *madaniyah* was purely the product of science and technology and is not influenced by outside ideology or worldview, Muslim then can utilize them. You Tube, *HizbutTahrîr Indonesia part 3*, uploaded by tedungselar on 14<sup>th</sup> November 2006, available at [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLYTtz94M\\_Q&feature=related](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLYTtz94M_Q&feature=related), accessed on 26<sup>th</sup> May 2011.

<sup>28</sup>S. Arifin, *Op.Cit.*, p. 248-249.

### The Scheme 1: Multi-dimensions Crisis<sup>29</sup>



#### The Establishment of Islamic System based on Islamic *Shari'a*

From this scheme, it can be said that when government implement the secular system in daily life, the various catastrophes would occur. Solution offered by HTI to overcome those problems is to establish the Islamic system which apply Islamic *shari'a* at all aspects in people life.

#### D. Alternative Solution

It has been argued that the main aim of *Hizbut tahrîr* and HTI is to encourage the completely implementation of *Islamic Sharia* by restoration of *caliphate* throughout Islamic world. Therefore, it is carefully observed, apparently, whatever problems are faced by Indo-

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*



nesia in terms of economic, politic, social, and religion, there is only one best breakthrough,<sup>30</sup> that is, the implementation of Islamic *Sharia* which is supported by establishing the caliphate.<sup>31</sup>

The Islamic caliphate is a form of Islamic government headed by a caliph. He is a leader of the *ummah* (Muslim community) and at the same time he is a representative of God who has to enforce the laws of God on earth. The caliphate is recognised as a just and legitimate system of ruler for Muslims. Thoughts embodied in the Qur'an, the *sunnah*, and what was implemented by caliphs in long-history of Islam became the legal framework of the system.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> The prominent distinguishing feature of HTI with other Islamic activism groups is that HTI make demand and solution which is always the same, though the issues they respond are completely different. HTI is more confident to believe that the revival of Islamic caliphate in which the implementation of the *Islamic Sharia* is applied is the most excellent breakthrough. Moreover, in the view of HTI, the main root of all drawbacks taking place in the Islamic world in general and in Indonesia in particular are emanated from the abolition of *Islamic caliphate* and the absence of applying *Islamic syariah*. As a result, both terms (*Islamic caliphate* and *Islamic syariah*) became a patent jargon that is inherent in every actions (rally, talk show, etc) conducting by HTI in responding anything, anytime, and anywhere. See Z. Mubarak, *Genealogi Islam Radikal di Indonesia; Gerakan, Pemikiran dan Prospek Demokrasi (The Genealogy of Radical Islam in Indonesia: Movement, Thoughts, and Democracy's prospects)*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2007), p., 247.

<sup>31</sup> The obligation of restoration of Islamic caliphate for HTI is because of three arguments: (1) normative, in this level this compulsion is based on what the Holy Koran and *Sunnah* declared, (2) historical precedence argument which refer to what was applied by the prophet Muhammad in *Medinah* era and events after the his death followed by a group of caliphs, known *khulafā al-rasyidūn* to replace the Prophets and HTI also adores other Islamic caliphates, like Umayyad, Abbasid, and Uthmaniyah in Turkey, (3) factual condition of Muslim's pain and misery which are largely dealing with Muslim such as the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the US invasion in Iraq and Afghanistan, the suppression against Muslim in Southern Thailand, the Philippines, Kashmir, Somalia, and so on. See B. Muhtadi, *Op.Cit.*, p. 631.

<sup>32</sup>F. Schneider, *Hizbut Tahrir : a Threat Behind a Legal Facade?*, Unpublished Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2006, p., 6. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA457669&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>. Accessed on: 12 May 2011

Here is shown the scheme of Islamic caliphate:




Figure 2: Organizational chart of *Hizbut tahrîr* 's vision for the Caliphate

To gain this main goal, the organization proposes a three-stage process for what *Hizbut tahrîr* claim as 'Islamic peace revolution'. The first is the culturing stage (*marḥalah at tatsqîf*); this stage aims to establish cadres who believe the truth of thoughts and methods of *Hizbut tahrîr* in order to form a group capable of carrying the party's ideas. The second is the interaction stage with *ummah* (*marḥalah--tafa'ulma'a al ummah*), it refers to encourage *ummah* to carry the Islamic *da'wah* obligation and so that it works to implement Islam in life, state, and society. The last stage is the accepting power or the takeover of power (government). This stage is intended to implement Islam totally and completely and to spread the Islamic message over the world.<sup>33</sup> However, HTI claim the use of violence is an inappropriate way to reach the third step and assert that an Islamic caliphate can only be gained when the majority of Muslim have Islamic attitude and are actively looking for an Islamic state.<sup>34</sup>

### **E. Resource Mobilization Strategies<sup>35</sup>**

As a social movement organized and structured, HTI is fully aware that to establish an Islamic caliphate needs the collective action and support of many people, at least those who agree with HTI's

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<sup>33</sup> M. D. J. Ruder, 'the long War in Central Asia: Hizbuttahrîr 's Caliphate', *a Monograph*, 2006, p 22. Available at: [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A-DA450614](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A-DA450614). Accessed on: 24<sup>th</sup> May 2011.

<sup>34</sup> G. Fealy, *Op.Cit.*, p. 159.

<sup>35</sup> Resource Mobilization theory is a response to limitation existing in the early sociopsychological approach which view a social movement consisting of irrational or angry Individuals who join to respond social strain. Resource Mobilization theory approach the social movements as rational and organized manifestations of collective action. Movements are not portrayed as irrational outbursts intended to reduce Individual's distress, but rather as organised contention structured through mechanisms of mobilization providing strategic resources to sustain collective action. See Q., Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 9-10.

ideology, though they are not necessarily to become cadre of HTI. For this purpose, HTI utilize a variety of ways to change the mindset<sup>36</sup> of society so as to accept HTI's message. It can be clearly seen that HTI use media publication including producing a weekly pamphlet (*Al-Islâm Bulletin*), publishing a monthly journal (*Al-Wai'e*), and also translating many books into *Bahasa Indonesia*.<sup>37</sup>

Using online resources and digital sources is other way by making its own website (<http://www.Hizbut-tahrîr .or.id>). Beside this, HTI is creatively establishing informal virtual group such as Face Book community, You Tube, the ummah Online Forum and Melayu.com, and so forth. In term of intellectual activities, HTI is very vigorously conducting seminar, talks and conferences.<sup>38</sup> In addition, HTI is very energetically in using demonstrations and rallies to galvanize support from the public and build public awareness of the truth of their ideology<sup>39</sup> and also HTI usually utilize mosques as part of their strategy to disseminate their thoughts. Unlike NU and Muhammadiyah organization which build and preserve mosques, HTI only focuses on to be members of mosque committee and subsequently dominating mosque activities.

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<sup>36</sup>According to spokesman of HTI, Ismail Yusanto, there are three basic elements binding society, namely, feelings, thoughts, and rules. He declared that to gain the acceptance of society toward *Islamic sharia* and *caliphate* ideology Islamic value should permeate within these components, therefore society will think, feel in line with *Islamic Sharia*, and live under Islamic rules. All aspects of life have to be governed by the Islamic values. You Tube, *HizbutTahrîr Indonesia part 3*, uploaded by tedungselar on 14<sup>th</sup> November 2006, available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLYTz94MQ&feature=related>, accessed in 26<sup>th</sup> May 2011.

<sup>37</sup>Explanation about this matter is extracted from the paper authored by M. N. M. Osman.

<sup>38</sup>In seminar and talks, HTI very often invite the important figures (such as Abu BakarBa'asyir, Sidney Jones, etc) in Indonesian society from outside the group as speaker, even inviting political or religious figures who disagree with their ideology to debate them in the certain issues like *khilâfah*, etc.

<sup>39</sup>Issues delivering in such demonstration related to not only local problems such as corruption, unemployment, poverty, etc., but also international issues are very often becoming their concern. Because HTI is a branch of HizbututTahrîr and has international network with their counterparts elsewhere over the world.

Another interesting strategy in mobilizing resources used by HTI is necessity to outside assistance<sup>40</sup> (*nusrah*).<sup>41</sup> This assistance can be from strategic groups within the community, elite politics, and other Islamic activism group, which could join in restoring the caliphate. Not surprisingly, HTI often hold the events with inviting politicians and after these sort contacts, HTI leaders will organize regular meeting with those politicians to propagate their ideology to them. Alongside politician's network, HTI build relationships with other Islamists.<sup>42</sup>

By utilizing these structured and organized various strategies in spreading HTI's ideology, there is no doubt that HTI will have a significant influence<sup>43</sup> in the social-religious life and politic, particularly the rise of acceptance of the public toward HTI's main aim in their movement. Although, recognized by spokesmen (Ismail Yusanto)<sup>44</sup> of HTI itself that this mission is still difficult to be realized but not impossible in the future it will come true.

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<sup>40</sup>G. Fealy, *Op.Cit.*, p. 159.

<sup>41</sup> The use of informal network is very important because HTI leaders can connect with important figures by inviting them in HTI events, then, by getting involved these informal structures would allow HTI leaders to influence certain Muslim groups, and last because these informal structures encourage HTI leader to disseminate their agenda without worrying to face repression. M. N. M. Osman, p. 24-25.

<sup>42</sup>For example HTI persuade the former spiritual head of the Jemaah Islamiyah (Abu Bakar Ba'asyir) and the leader of Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam), Habib Rizieq to become the revival of caliphate as key platform of their movement. M. N. M. Osman, p. 32.

<sup>43</sup>HTI capability to galvanize or mobilize mass (through former chairman, Muhammad al-Khatathor) organized the one million Muslim march in calling for anti-pornography laws (for example) to enforce Indonesian government in making policy such the enactment of anti-pornography and the banning of Ahmadiyah pose an indicator that HTI has influence in society. M. N. M. Osman, p. 31-32.

<sup>44</sup>You Tube, *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia part 4*, uploaded by tedungselar on 14<sup>th</sup> November 2006, available at [http://www.youtube.com/-watch?v=OLYTtz-94M\\_Q&feature=related](http://www.youtube.com/-watch?v=OLYTtz-94M_Q&feature=related), accessed in 26<sup>th</sup> May 2011.

## **F. Conclusion**

It can be concluded that the presence of *Hizbut Tahrîr* and also HTI in Indonesian context emanates from their concerns for Muslim's conditions. They claimed that Muslims experience various drawbacks in many levels of their lives. This is because of implementing *kufur* (unbelievers) system in Muslim society, a system which is from outside Islam and absolutely not in line with Islamic values. To escape from these obstacles, Muslim must abolish this *kufur* system and go back to completely Islamic teachings by establishing an Islamic caliphate that applies *Shari'a* laws within.

As a social movement, *Hizbut tahrîr* and HTI utilize structured and organized strategies in achieving their aim. In the case of Indonesia for example, HTI use various ways such as the use of IT, building networks with other Islamic Activism, conducting seminar, talks, conferences, getting involved in events held by other organizations or political parties, and so forth. Lastly, HTI never uses violence to spread their ideology.

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